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Summary findings
Jack examines public economics rationales for public  delivered, have tried to extend formal coverage to
intervention  in health insurance markets, draws on the  previously marginalized groups, and have tried to finance
literature of organizational design to examine alternative  this extension fairly.
intervention  strategies, and considers health insurance  Colombia instituted an implicit two-tiered voucher
reforms in four Latin American countries-Argentina,  scheme financed through a proportional  wage tax.
Brazil, Chile, and Colombia-in  light of the theoretical  Chile's financing mechanism is similar but the
literature.  distribution of benefits is less progressive, so the net
Equity has been the main reason for large-scale public  effect is less redistributive.
intervention in the health insurance sector, despite the  Argentina's remodeled obras system went halfway: the
well-known failures of insurance and health care markets  financing base is similar and there is some implicit
associated with imperfect information.  redistribution from richer to poorer obras, but the
Recent reforms have sought less to make private  quality of insurance increases with income.
markets more efficient than to make public provision  On the face of it, Brazil's health insurance system is
more efficient, sometimes by altering the focus and  less redistributive than those of the other three countries,
function of existing institutions  (such as the obras  as no tax is earmarked for financing health insurance.
sociales in Argentina) or by encouraging the growth of  But taxes paid by higher-income taxpayers are not
new ones (such as Chile's ISAPREs).  reduced when they choose private insurance,
Generally, these four Latin American countries have  highlighting the problem of examining the health sector
reformed the ways insurance and care are organized and  independent of the general tax and transfer system.
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Health care expenses and  lost  labor earnings due  to illness represent a major  source of risk for
individuals and families. Exposure to such risks is costly in itself (if individuals are risk averse),
but can also have long-term effects especially  on the poor. Selling assets, withdrawing children from
school to care for ill parents, and exiting the labor market can leave low-income  families trapped  in
poverty.
Protection against the risks of ill health can be achieved  by reducing the size and variability of the
underlying stochastic process, for instance by improving public goods that  affect health outcomes
(pollution, etc.),  and  by spreading risks across individuals.  This paper will address the  second
of these risk reduction strategies,  with particular emphasis on the  design and  organization of the
relevant institutions  in Latin America.
Given its income, Latin America is on average a relatively  healthy part of the world. For example,
Figure  1 shows data  from  157 countries that  reported  information on GDP  per capita  and  life
expectancy in 1997 (Latin American countries are represented as squares, the others as diamonds').
Visual inspection of the simple logarithmic regression  indicates that most Latin American countries
have life expectancies at birth. equal to or significantly above those predicted by their income levels.
Health outcomes measured by infant mortality rates are less positive however,  as shown in Figure
2.  Similarly, the distribution  of health care services within Latin American countries is skewed to
the better  off.  Recent analysis undertaken by PAHO, UNDP, 2 and the  World Bank, (Greene et
al. (1999)) indicates wide disparities in both health needs and access to medical care across income
groups. This, coupled with incomplete and fragmented insurance coverage,  led several countries in
the region to adopt wide-ranging health sector reforms in the latter part of the  1980s  and the 1990s
that  continue today.
Large scale changes in health insurance and health care markets inevitably involve significant
'Source:  World Development  Indicators,  1999, World Bank.
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3public intervention.  The purpose of this paper is first, in section 2, to examine the arguments in
favor of such intervention from a public economics  perspective. Having identified market failure and
redistributional rationales for public intervention, section 3 addresses  the important issue of how the
government should intervene. This is effectively  a question of organizational design, incorporating
ideas from industrial organization, contract theory, and the theory of the firm. In this light, section
4 undertakes a detailed examination of the reforms pursued in Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile.  These countries reflect a variety of routes toward the goals of expanding formal insurance
coverage and improving the efficiency  of service delivery in their health  systems. These directions
of reform are interpreted within the framework  developed in sections 2 and 3. Section 5 concludes.
2  Reasons  for  government  intervention  in the  health  sector
The theoretical literature  on the  performance of insurance markets is well developed. Not all of
the market failures that  may arise in such markets, however,  necessarily  justify public intervention.
This section examines the efficiency  and equity reasons for intervention in health insurance markets,
paying specific attention to the informational constraints facing governments.
2.1  Market  failure  in  the  health  insurance  sector
It is useful to briefly  review sources  of inefficiency  in the delivery  of health insurance, and to examine
the extent to which public intervention can correct the associated market failures. The inefficiencies
derive mainly from information asymmetries and  imperfect competition, and  less from standard
public goods and externality characteristics.
Asyrmmetric information  - moral hazard
The role of information in the performance  of insurance markets has been widely appreciated. In
the health insurance literature, Feldstein (1973), Pauly (1968), and Zeckhauser (1970) showed  how
asymmetric information at the ex post stage - that  is, after an insured event has occurred - can
4reduce the efficiency  of equilibrium insurance contracts. This moral hazard occurs when insurance
contracts are written on the basis of endogenous  incurred expenses and not on the basis of exogenous
health  needs.  This kind of insurance leads to over-consumption  of care, the distortionary costs of
which are offset by reducing the level of insurance.
A similar inefficiency  results from "ex interim" moral hazard, when precautionary actions can
be taken  after the  insurance contract is signed, but  before uncertainty is resolved.  In this  case,
the  inability to make insurance contracts contingent on such actions reduces the  optimal level of
insurance. In both cases, the individual is second-best optimally exposed to some risk.
Within a partial equilibrium model neither source of moral hazard argues for public intervention,
unless one assumes unrealistically that the government has better information than private insurers.
On the other hand,Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986)  showed  that, taking a general equilibrium approach,
there  may be  a  role for government intervention, even when the  govemment does not  have an
information advantage vis-A-vis  private insurers. Their argument is simply that, through it's powers
of taxation and subsidization, the government can encourage desirable ex interim actions by altering
the prices of goods and services that  have non-zero cross elasticities of demand with such actions.
Thus, taxing cigarettes may reduce the (assumed unobservable)  ex interim action of smoking, thus
mirroring an efficient  insurance contract.  The scope for such Pareto improving intervention becomes
more limited as private insurance contracts become more sophisticated, e.g., by disallowing  benefits
to smokers.
Asymmetric  information  - adverse  selection
While moral hazard derives from asymmetric information that  is generated after contracts are
signed, adverse selection occurs in markets when information is held asymmetrically at  the  date
of contracting.  A competitive insurance market in a population with heterogeneous ex ante risk
characteristics may perform inefficiently  if insurance contracts cannot be differentiated on the  basis
of these risks.
When only a single insurance policy is available, Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem may emerge,
5with a proportion of individuals choosing  not to purchase insurance. On the other hand, if multiple
contracts are available, then even when risk characteristics are unobservable it becomes possible for
insurers to charge low-risk individuals lower prices. All individuals will have some insurance in an
equilibrium (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)), but two problems may arise: first, the good risks will
not have full insurance, and second, an equilibrium may not exist.
Evidence of the lemons-type of equilibrium (in which a fraction of the population is uninsured)
has been provided in a number of studies (e.g., Cutler and Zeckhauser (1997), and Cutler and Reber
(1998)). The relevance of the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is possibly more debatable, since it is
typically high-risk individuals who have trouble obtaining full insurance against  health  risks, and
not low risks, as their  model suggests.  However, since risk is correlated with other determinants
of insurance coverage (such as income, education, etc.)  it is probably imprudent  to  dismiss the
underlying model.
Government intervention cannot easily correct these market failures. In both models, universal
and  uniform coverage can be  mandated,  but  the  resulting resource and  risk allocations are  not
Pareto-comparable with the initial equilibrium.
Imperfect  competition
The models of adverse selection reviewed above identified failures of competitive insurance mar-
kets.  But  even in the  absence of adverse selection problems, insurance markets may yield socially
sub-optimal resource and risk allocations if firms have market power.  Such market power may de-
rive from information imperfections on the demand side, say contributing to switching costs (which
make it difficult for new firms to attract  customers). Also, increasing returns in administrative costs
suggest that  a somewhat concentrated industry is likely to be observed in equilibrium.
In standard  industrial organization models, while market power typically leads to allocative in-
efficiency,  what competition there is is generally welfare improving. However, in insurance markets
with information asymmetries, competition may sometimes have negative effects on allocative effi-
ciency. For example, when insurers are faced with a heterogeneous risk population they  will have
6incentives  to sell policies only to low-risk individuals  - i.e., those  individuals  to whom  it is cheap to
provide  insurance.  If they  cannot  offer different  policies to different  risk types,  then  they  may  lower
the  quality  of the  policies they  do sell to make  them sufficiently  unattractive  to high-risk  individuals
(Jack,  forthcoming).  This  kind of selection  incentive might suggest public  intervention  to control  the
extent,  or  at  least  type,  of competition  in the  insurance  market.  I will refer  to this  effect as  active
selection  - the  selection  by firms,  because  of their  policies,  of good  risks,  as  opposed  to  adverse
selection  - the selection  by firms, in spite of their  policies,  of bad  risks.
Consumer  protection
Quality  of care
The  examples  of moral  hazard  above concentrated  on the  behavior  of consumers  when  they  are
at  an  informational  advantage  vis-A-vis the  provider  of insurance.  One  response  by  insurers  is to
try  to improve  the information  they  have about  consumers,  by undertaking  "utilization  reviews"  -
essentially  checking that  doctors  are  not  providing  "too  much"  care.  In  order  to motivate  doctors,
insurers  may  indeed  give them  stakes  in the  insurance  company,  converting  it  to  a managed  care
organization.
Such an  organizational  design  is efficient,  as long as  the  information  asymmetry  is removed  -
that  is,  as  long  as  information  about  health  status  (and  the  effects of  medical  interventions  and
their  costs)  is held  symmetrically  by all parties.  In practice  the  physician  is the  primary  source  of
this  information,  so that  when  acting  as  the  patient's  agent  he  confers  an  information  advantage
on  the  patient  vis-A-vis the  insurer.  However,  when  acting  for  the  insurer,  the  physician  may  put
the  patient  at  a disadvantage,  and warranted  treatments  could be withheld.  The usual  competitive
forces that  induce  firms  to  keep quality  high  may  not  work  well in  this  situation,  and  quality  of
care could  suffer.  One can  appeal  to the  literature  on consumer  protection  and  safety  standards  in
support  of the  role of government  in markets  with uninformed  consumers.
Financial  regulation
Insurance  companies  perform  similar  functions  to banks.  Banks  facilitate  inter-temporal  trades
7(saving  and  dissaving)  implemented  through  contemporary  inter-personal  trades  (lending  and  bor-
rowing),  while insurance  companies  facilitate  trades  between uncertain  states  of nature  implemented
through  inter-personal  pooling  of current  risks.
The  transformation  function  of  banks  (converting  short-term  savings  into  long-term  project
funds)  results  in  a mis-match  between  the  time  profiles  of assets  and  liabilities  in banks'  balance
sheets,  introducing  a moral hazard  problem  with regard to the behavior  of asset  managers.  Similarly,
insurance  companies  tend  to  collect premiums  in advance  of the resolution  of uncertainty,  and  may
optimally  build  up  resources  in order  to  self-insure  against  systemic  risks.  In  this  case,  insurance
company  managers  must  choose how and where  to invest  these  funds.  A feature  of health  insurance
that  is not  common  to  banks  in  this  regard  is the  fact  that  the  real  value  of the  firm's  assets  is
a function  of two  factors:  the  quality  of financial  investments,  and  the  costs  of providing  medical
services.
Dewatripont  and  Tirole  (1994)  use an  incomplete  contracts  model  to show that  bank  managers
can be given appropriate  incentives  to perform  by transferring  control  from equity  holders  (who have
relatively  weak incentives  to interfere  with  management)  to debt  holders  (whose incentives  to inter-
fere are stronger)  when  bank  performance  as measured  by the value  of assets  is poor.  This allocation
of authority  is in place of a more  sophisticated,  but  infeasible,  explicit  performance  contract.  The
role of government  is then  to  act as a representative  of small,  uncoordinated  debtors,  and the  theory
rationalizes  public  take-overs  of distressed  banks  as a means  of providing  incentives  to managers.
A similar  role can  be ascribed  to the  government  with  respect  to health  insurance  regulation.  If
the  value  of  a firm's  assets  falls  enough,  the  government  may  wish to  intervene  and take  over the
administrative  functions  (maybe  contracting  out such  administration  to  another  healthy  insurer).
Life-time  insurance  and  non-diversifiable  risks
A final important  failure  of insurance  markets  is that  they often do not provide  life-time insurance.
Since individuals'  health  needs  exhibit  a degree  of autocorrelation,  insurance  that  is actuarially  fair
only on an annual  basis exposes  the  individual  to a high variance  of medical  costs over the  lifetime.
8Part  of the  reason  it  is  difficult  to  provide  life-time  insurance  is that  the  future  development  of
medical care prices is itself uncertain,  due mainly to the vagaries of technological  and epidemiological
dynamics.  These components  of risk are systemic,  so cannot  easily be insured  against  (except  inter-
temporally,  across  generations).  The  government  faces the  same  constraints  as  private  insurers
in terms  of  the  nature  of the  systemic  risks,  but  may  be  in a  better  position  to  facilitate  inter-
generational  trades  due to  its power  of taxation.
2.2  Equity
Efficiency  is a relatively  uncontroversial  goal of economic policy  and  organization.  However, in the
health  care and  health  insurance  sectors,  equity  is equally, if not  more, important  in shaping policy.
This may  be because  individuals  are more willing to accept differences in general income  levels than
in the  status  of health  across  individuals.
At a conceptual  level,  having  high medical  needs,  or being  at  high  risk  of needing  medical  at-
tention,  reduces  an  individual's  available  budget  set.  In  consequence,  the  government  may wish to
redistribute  resources  between  individuals  with  identical  money  incomes.  In  practice,  the  redistri-
bution  from  healthy  to sick is often  attempted  by imposing  uniform  prices for  health  services and
for health  insurance  across  individuals.  Of  course,  charging  uniform  prices  for doctor  visits  is not
redistributive  if the  sick must  visit  the doctor  more often  than  the healthy.
On the other  hand,  in insurance  markets,  uniform pricing of insurance  policies across  individuals
is a feasible tool  for redistribution  from low risks to high risks.  However, requiring  private  firms to
community  rate  may  only exacerbate  adverse  selection  and  active  selection  problems  that  already
exist.
It  is important  to  note  that,  even  if selection  issues  were  unimportant,  it  would  still  be  only
second-best  to  require  uniform  insurance  pricing.  The  first-best  policy, of course,  is to redistribute
income (lump-sum)  from low risks to high risks, and to require each individual  to buy insurance  at the
actuarially  fair price  (i.e., to allow price discrimination  by firms).  Such redistribution  is notoriously
9difficult, and even more so when income inequality itself is high, as it is in many Latin  American
countries. Indeed, a social welfare maximizing planner will likely wish to redistribute from rich to
poor, and from less risky to more risky. This multi-dimensional problem 6f redistributive taxation
is difficult,  even when the government restricts itself to simple  linear tax and transfer systems (Jack
(1999)).
Henriet and Rochet (1999) have recently analyzed the optimality of a uniform public insurance
system within the  context of a similar multi-dimensional redistribution problem.  In the  absence
of moral hazard,  they  find that  a comprehensive  insurance policy providing full insurance to all
individuals is part of an optimal tax and insurance system. This result relies to some extent on the
assumption that  individuals face the same distribution of losses, albeit with different probabilities.
As the demand for health care is income elastic, however,  the financial  cost of care consumed  when ill
is an endogenous  function of income (and is in fact limited by the individual's available  income). This
suggests that  the poor may prefer additional income transfers and less extensive public insurance to
being offered the same level of coverage as the non-poor. Alternatively, the rich may be willing to
pay somewhat higher taxes in order to have more comprehensive  insurance than the poor.
This discussion leads us to expect that  in the presence of health risk and income differentials
across the  population,  and  in the  absence of first-best redistributive taxation,  governments will
likely wish to couple a progressive general tax source (e.g., an income tax) with a system of health
insurance (privately or publicly supphed - more on this later) that  delivers  subsidized insurance to
the poor, but allows coverage  to increase with income.
One means of effecting  such a graduated insurance profile  is to have a mixed public/private system
of insurance, in which the  government provides (or mandates) a given base level of insurance, and
individuals are permitted  to top up their coverage through private purchases, or to opt out of the
public system and purchase private insurance. For example, Besley and Coate  (1991) have shown
that  public provision of insurance (of low enough quality) can be used as a  redistributive tool as
long as individuals have access  to supplementary private coverage. Using a political economic model
10with three classes of voters, Gouveia (1997) also establishes the  use of opting out as  a means of
implementing non-uniform insurance coverage in the presence of a progressive income tax.  Such
a  system is supported  by the  rich, since the  cost of purchasing their  preferred level of (privately
provided) insurance is less that the taxes they would pay for a similar  level financed through taxation.
The poor also support  the mixed system because they have a lower demand for coverage  - they
would prefer to save some of their taxes that  would finance better coverage in order to purchase
other goods. 3
3  The  nature  of government  intervention
The arguments above have suggested that  either due to market inefficiencies  (mainly adverse se-
lection) and  redistributive  concerns, governments may wish to control individuals' choices about
insurance in certain ways.  What  the discussion does not tell us is how such control over choices
should be effected. In this  section we examine the design of public interventions recognizing that
the productive efficiency  of insurance is a function of the administrative costs incurred and the costs
of providing covered services. Costs of provision of insurance and medical care can be controlled
through explicit contractual arrangements between insurer and provider, organizational choices (e.g.,
vertical integration), and competition. These three avenues are considered in turn.
3.1  Motivating  physicians
In many markets, providers of goods or services are paid on the basis of outputs, not inputs, providing
strong incentives for efficient production. It is well understood however that insured medical services
3There is a growing literature  on normative and political  economic models of the public provision of private  goods
- see  Blomqvist  and Christiansen  (1999) for  a useful summary.  Uniform public  provision of a private  good,  such as
health  insurance,  can  be  welfare improving  to  the  extent  that  imposing  quantity  constraints  on  some individuals'
choices weakens self-selection constraints  in  the optimal  income tax  problem.  These ideas are further  elaborated  on
in Blomqvist  and Christiansen  (1998a) and (1998b).
11are nearly never compensated in this  fashion.  For example, an  insurance policy that  reimburses
incurred costs gives the provider no incentive to choose an efficient  input mix.
The underlying problem here is one of motivating physicians and hospital administrators. When
neither health  output  nor  physician effort is directly purchasable (i.e., contractible) then  effort
incentives may be difficult to generate without exposing the  physician to undesirable risk. At two
extremes are the salaried physician and the decentralized fund holder. Under the first arrangement,
an insurer (possibly the government) pays the physician a fixed amount, independent of his supply
of effort, and reimburses non-physician expenses (e.g., laboratory tests).  In  the absence of ethical
concerns or job satisfaction (which are likely  to be significant in many instances), doctors will  tend to
substitute out of personal effort and into complementary inputs. On the other hand, a decentralized
fund holder, who is given a fixed budget to finance all incurred costs (including the cost of his own
effort) will have strong incentives to choose  the right input mix.
The trade-off, as in any moral hazard problem, is between incentives  and risk. A salaried physi-
cian faces little personal financial risk associated with expensive cases, since he is reimbursed for
other costs. On the other hand, a fund holder  with good effort incentives  must bear the full costs of
treating expensive cases, and so might be exposed to considerable risk. This generates a potential
alternative  source of inefficiency: if providers attempt  to  reduce their  risk exposure by inducing
hard to treat  patients to switch physicians,  then these active selection attempts  can increase equi-
librium costs, or reduce quality.  If instead the physician is provided with some insurance against
hard-to-treat  cases directly by the payer, then his incentives to perform are weakened.
It  should be clear from this  discussion  that  the  trade-offs between risk and  incentives at  the
provider level are not specific to the public sector.  Private  insurance companies also must induce
physicians to implement insurance contracts at  minimum cost, and  so face a similar optimization
problem. Some  endogenous  differences  across the public and private sectors  may emerge however that
imply different contractual relationships between payers (the government, or insurance companies)
and  providers of medical care.  For example, if public insurance is aimed at the  poor, then  in the
12absence  of  accurate  eligibility  tests  self-selection  constraints  may  require  that  the  public  system
provide  a relatively  low quality  of service.  Inducing  low effort from  physicians  who provide  services
to the public  system  (they  might  still be in the private  sector,  not public  sector  employees)  might  be
easier  than  inducing  the  higher  effort, and  hence service quality,  characteristic  of private  insurance
companies  who,  in equilibrium,  serve the  non-poor.  One  might  expect  then  to  see relatively  flat
incentive  schemes  for  physicians  serving  the  public  insurance  system,  and  steeper  compensation
schedules  employed by private  insurers.
Another  reason that  public and private  insurance  systems may provide different incentive schemes
to physicians  is that  physicians  may represent  a heterogeneous  group.  If they  differ in their  aversion
to risk,  in their  ethical  priorities,  or in their  job  satisfaction,  it may  be optimal  to offer one kind of
compensation  contract  to one group of physicians,  and  another  kind to a second group.
Once again,  however, these  arguments  suggest reasons that  we might see different ways of paying
physicians  emerge  in the  delivery  of health  insurance,  but  they  are not  necessarily  the  outcome  of
a public-private  mix  of insurance  provision.  For  example,  it  is easy  to  imagine  a purely  private
market  becoming  vertically  segmented,  with some plans  targeting  low-demand  consumers  (i.e., the
relatively  poor),  and others  targeting  the non-poor,  with a corresponding  range of provider  payment
mechanisrns.
3.2  Purchaser-provider  split  versus vertical  integration
The  previous  section  examined  issues  of  how to  pay  physicians,  under  the  assumption  that  such
payment  mechanisms  were implemented  through  explicit  contractual  agreements.  Instead  of writing
a detailed  contractual  agreement  between insurer and physician,  the two parties  might decide instead
to integrate  into a single organization,  and to rely on bargaining  protocols  to determine  the allocation
of rents.  T)raditionally, in many  countries  in Latin America  and elsewhere,  public  insurance  systems
have  been  vertically  integrated  to  a significant  degree.  Recent  reforms  however  have focused  on
separating  the  functions  of insurance  and provision,  through  the  so-called  purchaser-provider  split.
13These reforms effectively  require that explicit contractual arrangements govern  relationships between
insurers and providers.
On the other hand traditionally, private insurance was of the fee-for-service  type (i.e., indemnity
plans), whereby a physician would send a bill to the  insurer for covered services. This is one kind
- indeed a common one - of explicit contract.  Over time, however,  private insurance companies
have moved towards a more integrated organizational structure, bringing physicians in-house, or at
least adopting long-term contractual relationships with them. 4 This apparent anomaly between the
evolution of the organization of public and private systems can be understood in a number of ways.
Soft  budget  constraints
First,  both  institutional  developments might  represent attempts  to provide physicians with
stronger incentives, within constraints that  differ between the public and private sectors. For exam-
ple, it might be difficult  for a government  bureaucracy to commit to funding a public sector employee
prospectively, thereby making him the residual claimant. Thus, if future renegotiation in the event
of high costs makes it difficult to credibly threaten punishment, endogenous  soft budget constraints
limit incentives. Conversely,  if political pressure is likely  to force governments  to expropriate profits
(or to renegotiate future contracts) in the event  of low  costs, incentives  will again be dulled. By con-
tracting explicitly with the private sector - i.e., by adopting a purchaser-provider split - a public
payer may be able to harden what would otherwise be an endogenously  soft budget constraint.
On the  other hand, the easiest way for a private payer to provide a physician with incentives
might be to make him a shareholder in the insurance firm. (Of course, there are obvious free-rider
problems when physicians are paid on the basis of group profits and not individual contributions
thereto.)
Common  agency  in public  institutions
4 It is important not to trivialize  the nature of private  insurance  organizational  structures. In reality a wide  range of
organizational  forms  exists, ranging from for-profit  firms  with share-holder  doctors to non-profit  HMOs with salaried
providers.
14A second way  to understand the opposing directions of reforms in the public and private sectors is
to look more closely  at the nature of the purchaser-provider  split arrangements. In particular, instead
of contracting directly with individual physicians (as we assumed in the preceding paragraphs), a
public insurance system might sign contracts with groups of physicians  - indeed often with managed
care organizations.  This suggests that  the function that  is being contracted out from the  public
system is the  management of physician services. Having a formal arm's length contract  between
the  public sector and  the  manager of physician services might be an  effective way of improving
the incentives of such a  manager.  For example, building on the work of Williamson (1985) and
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), Dixit (1997) has shown that  when an agent (here the  manager)
reports to multiple non-cooperative principals with heterogeneous  objectives, a negative externality
exists amongst the principals that results in low-powered  incentives  for the manager. 5 The implicit
side contracts that may easily exist in a political environment  support such a view of the constraints
on incentives  of public sector managers (but less so for individual physicians). Requiring an explicit
contract could facilitate the cooperation of the principals, removing the externality, and leading to
higher-powered  incentives for the manager. 6
Explicit arm's length contractual arrangements might also be a way of limiting the scope of a
manager's activities. The usefulness  of limiting objectives  of public sector decision-makers  has been
suggested by Tirole (1994) and formally elaborated in a model of career concerns by Dewatripont,
Jewitt,  and Tirole (1999). Providing a manager with a well-defined  "mission" again makes it easier
to induce effort. In Dixit's analysis the narrowing of a manager's objectives is effected  by reducing
the number of competing principals to whom the manager answers.
sThe  model relies on the manager  taking a number of actions or efforts.  Principals  preferences over the outcomes
of different actions differ. Each principal will then propose  a contract that  offers the agent  more insurance by making
payment negatively  correlated  with performance in dimensions that  the principal does not care for.  All principals  act
the  same, resulting  in a dilution  of incentives.
6Contracting  out to  a private  manager may not  be necessary.  Corporatization  - an intermediate  step - may be
sufficient.
15Contractual  incompleteness
An alternative  literature  examines issues of contracting out versus internal provision - i.e.,
vertical integration - starting  from the  presumption that  contracts are necessarily incomplete.
Even if choices are observable by both  parties to a contract, if they are not verifiable and if the
contract is consequently unenforceable, then institutional arrangements can have substantive effects
on incentives. In particular, ownership of productive assets can matter when explicit contracts are
unavailable - private contractors are those who own the  assets they use to produce services (e.g.,
hospitals), while public servants do not have the implied control rights over asset use.
Hart,  Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) present a  model of service provision when quality and cost
are non-contractible. 7 By definition, public sector employees  cannot retain ownership of any quality
innovations they generate, while private sector providers can.  Incentives for quality innovations are
thus greater in the private sector. On the other hand, incentives  for cost reduction are also greater
in the private sector, but cost control is associated with lower quality. Thus the private sector will
always (in the model) produce at lower cost, but could produce higher or lower quality. When one
of the ways of reducing costs is to actively select  easy-to-treat patients ahead of expensive cases, the
social aspects of quality can be severely effected by incentives to control costs.
One might be willing to argue that  innovations in medical care are very important,  while those
in insurance administration are less so. This argument favors private provision of physician services,
under the condition that  active selection could be controlled adequately. However,  in countries with
large sections of the population uninsured against health needs responsive to standard treatments,
innovation in insurance delivery may have high social payoffs, in which case public provision may
then be favored.
71f cost is  non-contractible,  then  procurement  contracts  like those  studied  by Laffont and  Tirole  (1993) are  not
feasible, and a fixed price  contract  must be used.
163.3  Competition
Competition within the  public sector, in the  private sector, and  between the  two, can provide
incentives  for quality provision and cost-reducing  effort on the part of medical  care practitioners.  The
important feature of competition is the discipline it allows  consumers to place on service providers.
Competition  within  government:  quasi-markets
Competition among suppliers should not necessarily  be identified with private supply. Indeed,
the UK government  has attempted to induce competition among public providers by developing  the
so-called  quasi-market (Le Grand (1991)). Even when consumers  do not face financial incentives  to
choose wisely between suppliers, they might still induce effort and quality provision  if their choices
affect the payoffs  to providers. Thus Halonen and Propper (1999) model the impact of competition
on quality when providers are paid by a public sector payer on behalf of consumers  who are free to
choose  their supplier. The essential feature of their model is that when providers' objectives are not
coincident with consumers' (on average), allowing consumer choice can help to realign providers'
incentives. The benefits of competition are of course limited by the elasticity of demand.
Private  sector  competition
Competition can improve incentives, but can also have negative effects. The discussion above
centered on public sector providers' incentives  to attract patients through quality improvements. An
important aspect of quality is that, while it is reasonable to assume that  all individuals value more
quality than less, the willingness  to pay for quality varies  with health needs. In general, a hospital is
likely  to face a higher elasticity of demand with respect to quality from patients with high needs  than
from patients with low needs, assuming an alternative source of supply exists. Competition can then
result in a kind of "race to the bottom," in which all hospitals try to deter high cost patients from
seeking treatment by under-providing quality. Such negative effects of competition would not arise
if hospitals were able to charge sufficiently  higher amounts for treating expensive patients.  Similar
forces are likely  to be at work in private insurance markets.
17In  some  private  health  insurance  markets  consumers  are  required  to  commit  ex  ante  to  limit
their  ex post  choices, thus  weakening  the  competitive  pressures  they  can  exert  on physicians.  This
occurs  under  various  managed  care arrangements  (HMOs,  PPOs,  etc.)  These  restrictions  reduce  ex
post  demand  elasticities,  allowing either  prices to be higher,  or  more likely, quality  to  be lower.8
Public-private  competition
A common  argument  in favor of large purchasing  groups  is the monopsony  power they  can wield
in negotiating  supply  contracts.  However,  as Propper  and Green  (1999) have  recently  pointed  out,
there  is no particular  merit  in such  actions  - market  power  is inefficient be  it  on the  supply  side
or the  demand  side.  They  suggest that  under  such  arrangements  staff will either  be  of poor  quality
(good  staff  will  be  driven  from  the  market  by low wages),  or  employment  contracts  will permit
outside  earnings  with  little  or  no monitoring,  weakening  incentives  for  performance  of primary  job
tasks.9 Introducing  competition  from  the private  sector may  thus lead to higher  public  sector  wages
and  costs,  but  with  a net  welfare  gain.  The  lesson  from  this  analysis  is simply  that  focusing  on
budgetary  impacts  alone  is not  sufficient to determine  welfare effects,  especially  if rationing  costs
(i.e., waiting  times,  search costs)  are included  (Danzon  (1992)).
Alternatively,  introducing  public  provision  into  a private  market  may  be  beneficial  if it  serves
the  purpose  of  making  a minimum  quality  standard  credible.  For  example,  Ronnen  (1991)  has
shown  in a model  of vertical  product  differentiation  that  a minimum  quality  standard  can  raise the
quality  provided  by all market  participants  (even  those  who  would  have  met  the  standard  in the
absence  of regulation),  and  lower equilibrium  hedonic  prices  (i.e., prices  adjusted  for quality).  An
appropriately  chosen standard,  by restricting  product  differentiation  and intensifying  ex post  price
competition,  makes  all consumers  better  off.  Such a  standard  could  in principle  be  imposed  by
government,  without  recourse  to  public  provision.  If quality  is difficult  to monitor  however,  and  if
lapses  are costly  to penalize,  public  provision  of the  standard  quality  at  a minimal  price could  act
8For  a  review  of  models  of  strategic  competition  with  horizontal  product  differentiation,  see Tirole  (1989).
9Such  arrangements  are  often  found  in  academic  institutions,  particularly  ones  funded  from  public  sources.
18as  a substitute  for  direct  monitoring.  In  equilibrium,  private  sector  quality  would  be  higher  than
that  in the  public  sector,  and  any  increase  in prices would  not  be enough  to  outweigh  the  positive
effects of higher  quality.
The  idea  that  public  and  private  sector  quality  can  act  as  strategic  complements  should  be
viewed  with  some caution.  Standard  equilibrium  analysis  (Hammer  (1997))  suggests  the  need  to
anticipate  potential  crowding  out  of private  sector  supply  by public  sector  provision.  In the  case of
non-differentiated  goods  this  is indeed  appropriate,  and  one expects  that  if the  publicly  provided
quality  level was too  high then  private  supply would dry  up.
4  Institutional  evolution  in  Latin  America  - some  examples
Over  the  past  twenty  years  several  Latin  American  countries  have embarked  upon  wide-ranging
reforms of their  health insurance  and delivery systems.  Generally, among the higher-income  countries
there has been a move toward  extending  explicit insurance  coverage to those outside  the formal labor
market.  At the  same  time,  these  countries  have examined  the  ways in which insurance  and  health
care  have  been  delivered,  and  instituted  reforms  that  are  meant  to  improve  the  allocative  and
production  efficiency in the sector.  They  have tended  to move away from integrated  public  provision
of insurance  and care, in the  direction  of more decentralized  provision that  relies, to varying  extents,
on private  sector  involvement.  Major  health  insurance  reform,  like health  care itself, appears  to be a
luxury  good, and  the poorer  countries  in the region have focused on more basic  challenges in terms
of  primary  care delivery.  Below I will review  the  experiences  of four  countries  that  have  adopted
significant  reforms:  Colombia,  Argentina,  Brazil,  and Chile.10
10For  a more complete  survey of health systems  in Latin  America see Beugoa et al.  (1998).
194.1  Colombia
The health sector reforms  initiated in the early 1990s  under the direction  of Minister of Health
Londofio  represent  possibly  the most ambitious  policy  interventions  undertaken  since  the implemen-
tation of large-scale  social  security  mechanisms  of the 1950s  and 1960s,  both in Latin America,  and
outside  the region. Before  the reforms,  Colombia's  public  health delivery  system  was centralized,
budget-financed,  and poorly organized  and consisted  of two  uncoordinated  bodies: (1) the social
security  institutions  (SSIs),  that provided  subsidized  health services,  and hence  insurance,  to formal
sector workers;  and (2) the Ministry  of Health, that provided  public  health inputs, and subsidized
hospital care for those who  could not, or would  not, use the SSI  system. This sub-section  wil not
present a full history  of the "pre-existing  condition"  of the Colombian  system  or the reforms,  but
will examine  how  the reforms  conform  with some  of the general  organizational  structures  discussed
in sections  2 and 3..
Consistent  with the discussion  in the first  section  of  this paper,  the general  goal  of  the Colombian
reforms  appears to have been to ensure  a basic level  of coverage  for all individuals,  that could be
improved  upon for those willing  and able to pay more. The redistributive  nature of the reforms  is
manifest  in two aspects: first,  the tax base used to finance  the new  system  is at least proportional,
if not somewhat  progressive  (it consists  of a payroll  tax plus general  revenues);  and second,  since  in
the absence  of the reforms  many informal  sector workers  and their families  were formally  uninsured
the provision  of a basic  level  of insurance  at minimal  personal  cost  acts like  a negative  income  tax."1
There has indeed  been a marked  increase  in formal  coverage  of the population,  particularly  among
lower-income  groups. Figure  3 (composed  from  Cuadro  No. 7 of Uribe  et al. (1999))  shows  coverage
rates by income  quintile in 1993  and 1997. Overall,  the proportion  of individuals  with insurance
doubled  in this period from  23.7  percent  to 57.2  percent,  with  the largest  proportionate  gains among
1  l The uninsured did  receive health  care services under the  old system, mostly  from public hospitals  and clinics.  An
assumption  often made  is that  formal insurance  will lead individuals to  consume necessary care  earlier, to  have access
to  better  quality  care,  and to  face lower personal  costs.
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the poor.
At  the  same  time,  the  reforms  attempt  to improve  incentives  for productive  and  allocative  ef-
ficiency, by encouraging  alternative  provider  payment  systems  and  allowing  consumer  choice,  re-
spectively.  Integration  of a market  mechanism  for delivery  with  redistributive  objectives  presents
policy-makers  with  complex  issues of design.  Formally, there  are three  main  groups of actors:  con-
sumers,  purchasers,  and  providers.  A  fourth  agent  is the  government,  that,  while retaining  active
roles  in policy-making,  regulation,  and  public  health  initiatives,  acts  as a budget  balancer  (in that
it allows payments  made by any one of the  other  three not  to equal  those received by the recipient).
An  implicit  two-tiered  voucher  scheme
Insurance  coverage  is allocated  to  consumers  through  two regimes  with  separate  but  related  fi-
21nancing  arrangements.  I will discuss  these  below, but  it turns  out these  schemes  are approximately
equivalent  to  a simple two-level voucher  system,  although  no formal  voucher  scheme exists.  Effec-
tively,  members  of one group  of families  (those with workers in the formal  sector)  receive a voucher
for insurance  that  covers a wide range of services at  notionally  high quality,  while individuals  in the
complementary  set  (essentially  the poor)  receive a voucher for  a less generous  package  of insurance.
Members  in the  first  group  are said  to  be  in the  "contributory  regimen,"  and  those  in the  second
are referred  to  as participating  in the  "subsidized  regimen."
On the  financing  side,  participants  in the  contributory  regimen  pay  a  12 percent  payroll  tax
to  help  finance  health  care.  Although  this  tax  is earmarked  for health  services  provision,  because
its  payment  is non-discretionary  and  the  value  of the  implicit  voucher  received  upon  payment  is
unrelated  to the  amount  of tax  paid,  we can, without  loss of generality,  consider  the tax  to  be part
of general  revenue.12 That  is, the  distortionary  effects of financing  should  not  be  considered  to be
offset  by the  fact  that  individuals  receive something  - insurance  - in return  for paying  the  tax.
Participants  in the  subsidized  regime  also contribute  financial  resources  to  support  health  in-
surance  costs.  These  contributions  are  means  tested  (they  may  be  zero  in  many  cases)  and  not
directly  related  to  the  cost  of the  coverage  they  receive.  Since members  of the  subsidized  regimen
are  required  to  purchase  insurance,  the  contribution  acts  as  part  of the  general  tax  base  in terms
of its  distortionary  effects.  Thus  despite  the  nominal  link  between  financing  and  coverage  at  the
individual  level, it  is appropriate  to treat  financing  and  demand  as independent.
The  next  issue to  discuss  is where  and  how the  implicit  vouchers  can  be  "spent".  Participants
in the contributory  regimen  can  use their  vouchers  to buy insurance  from so-called  EPSs  (Empresas
Promotores  de Salud),  which are essentially  private  sector  insurance  companies.  The EPS  can  cash
in the  voucher  with  the  government  (via the  FOSYGA  - Fondo  de Solidaridad  y Garantfa)  for  a
fixed  amount,  known  as the UPC,  which is adjusted  for some of the risk  attributes  of the  consumer.
12There are of course questions  of optimal taxation  to  consider - is a wage tax more or less efficient than  another
revenue source, for example?  I will not  get in to  this here, however.
22Participants  in the subsidized  regimen can  use their  implicit  vouchers  to purchase  (less generous)
insurance  either  from  EPSs,  or  from  ESSs  (Empresas  Solidarias  de Salud).  ESSs  are medical  care
purchasing  organizations  that  subnational  governments  must  set up to facilitate  the  coverage of the
self-employed  and non-salaried  workers who may not  be able to access EPSs  (say due to remoteness).
Because the implicit  vouchers  have fixed monetary  values there  is little  effective price competition
amongst  EPSs  and ESSs.  They  are allowed  to charge  a price lower than  the  UPC,  but  none  of the
price  reduction  accrues  to  consumers,  so such  a policy has  little  if any effect  on demand.  Instead,
the  EPSs  compete  on the basis  of the  level of insurance  they  provide,  as determined  by copayment
rates,  quality  of service,  and  extra  services offered.  Thus,  the  standard  packages  of services  defined
for participants  in each regimen  act  as basic plans,  which can be supplemented  by insurers  to attract
clients.' 3 This kind of arrangement  encourages  efficient provision of insurance,  since the insurer  gets
to retain  any efficiency gains.
However,  there  are two  potential  problems  with  using  consumer  demand  to discipline  insurance
providers.  First,  if  demand  is  not  elastic  in  response  to  quality  changes  (i.e.,  if  individuals  can-
not  easily judge  quality  differences,  and  if they  do not  have easy access  to  alternative  providers),
incentives  to  control  costs  might  outweigh  incentives  to improve  or  maintain  quality.  Given  these
determinants  of demand,  it is arguable  that  demand  by participants  in the  subsidized  regimen  will
be  less  quality  elastic  than  that  of participants  in the  contributory  regimen,  so that  the  quality  of
insurance  provided  to the  poor  will be  reduced  further.
Second,  quality  competition  can  naturally  induce  active selection efforts  on the part  of EPS/ESS
managers,  who might  design  policies  to attract  inexpensive  clients,  perhaps  by bundling  extra  ser-
vices,  for which  an  additional  premium  can  be  charged,  with  elements  of the  standard  package.  If
the standard  package  is provided  at low quality,  but  additional  services are provided  at  high quality,
then  it  may  be  possible  for  firms to  attract  relatively  profitable  clients.  For  example,  La  Forgia
1
3The standard  package  in the  contributory  regimen  is  referred  to  as the  POS  (Plan  Obligatorio de Salud),  and
that  of the subsidized regimen  is the  POS-S.
23(1998, p.  257) reports  concern  over  "the  practice  of EPSs  to integrate  the  POS  [standard  package]
with complementary  plans,  thereby  undermining  competition  for a homogeneous  service plan."  Both
of these  concerns  can  in principle  be  addressed  by regulating  more  closely  the  quality  of insurance
provided,  but  there  are obvious  limits  to the efficacy of such  policies.
An intriguing  aspect  of the Colombian  system  is that  two basic  levels of insurance  are mandated
for separate  sections  of the  population.  Mitigation  of adverse  selection problems  and public  provision
(or  at  least  mandatory  consumption)  of a  private  good  to  facilitate  redistribution  as  discussed  in
the  first  section  of  the  paper  each  imposed  a  single  insurance  package  on  all  individuals.  The
resolution  of  this  apparent  anomaly  is  that  although  a  base  level  of  insurance  might  be  useful
in  redistributing  income  from  rich  to  poor,  within  the  group  of  individuals  who  would  purchase
supplementary  insurance  under  such  a system  significant  heterogeneity  of  risks will  likely  persist.
In order  to  facilitate  such  voluntary  supplementation  while  avoiding the  potential  adverse  selection
problem  within  this  (wealthier)  group,  another  specific insurance  contract  is imposed.'
4
The  supply  side
The efficiency of provision  is determnined by how providers  are paid,  and how they  are organized.
This  section  briefly  reviews  the  financial  arrangements  that  govern  incentives  and  the  degree  of
integration  of insurance  and  provision.
Demand  versus  supply  subsidies
On  the  supply  side,  EPSs  and  ESSs  contract  with  hospital  and  physician  groups,  including
private  sector  IPSs  (Instituticiones  Prestadoras  de Servicios),  and  formerly  public  sector,  but  now
autonomous,  ESEs  (Empresas  Sociales  del Estado).  The  financial  aspects  of  such  contracts  are
less precisely  regulated  than  are the  demand  side transactions  between  consumers  and EPSs/ESSs,
14  A simpler  explanation  for  the  use  of two  levels  of  mandatory  insurance  is that  it is too expensive  for the  ggvernment
to  finance  the  POS  for  the  poor.  Intentions  are  to  phase  the  POS-S  up  to  the  POS  over  time.  However,  if it  were
only  a matter  of  money,  the  question  would  then  arise  as  to  why  a uniform  coverage  plan,  below  the  POS  but  above
the  POS-S,  was  not  initially  introduced  for  all  individuals,  and  then  phased  up  over  time,  with  the  same  time  profile
of  budgetary  expenditures.  Presumably  the  answer  to  this  question  lies  in  the  political  realities  of  reform.
24although  the  law attempts  to encourage  innovative  payment  methods  to  encourage  provider  effort
and  efficiency (e.g., capitation,  DRG-based  payments).
One aspect  of the  reforms that  has received  some considerable  attention  is the fact  that  medical
care providers  are paid  on the  basis of demand.  That  is, insurers  contract  with providers  to supply
services for the  covered  clients,  based  on expected  (in the  case of capitated  payments)  or  realized
(in the case of fee-for-service and  DRG-based  contracts)  use.  In the  past,  when the government  paid
for services,  payments  were nearly  always purely  prospective,  deriving  from budgetary  allocations
to hospitals,  provincial  health  ministries,  etc.  The assumption  of many commentators  appears  to be
that  such a transition  is undeniably  beneficial.
However,  there  are  two  dimensions  along  which  we  might  expect  the  alternative  regimes  to
differ.  First,  in terms  of the  use of a fixed revenue  base, demand-based  financing  would appear  to
offer the  prospect  of a more  efficient allocation.  On the  other  hand,  due  to the  well-documented
price  elasticity  of demand  for health  care,  prospective  budgetary  allocations  have the  advantage  of
imposing  a cap  on aggregate  spending.  Indeed,  before the  reforms  Colombia  exhibited  a relatively
low level of health  expenditure  amounting  to around  4 percent  of GDP  in  1990, but  recently  this
has exploded  to nearly  11 percent  of GDP  in 1998. There  is some suggestion  that  this  expenditure
increase  has  been caused  by the  introduction  of demand  subsidies without  the  removal  of supply
subsidies  (so  hospitals  receive  budgetary  funds  and  can  additionally  charge  EPSs  and  ESSs  for
services provided),  so that  the welfare implications  are unclear.' 5 Nonetheless,  to  achieve allocative
efficiency  both  within  the  health  sector  and  across  sectors,  provider  payment  mechanisms  must
be carefully  designed,  incorporating  both  demand  side responsiveness  to needs,  and constraints  on
15The welfare effects derive from two sources:  the extent  to  which the  additional  expenditure  finances inefficient
production versus private consumption  (of medical personnel or hospital owners); and the shadow cost of public funds
That  is, if the additional  expenditures  are not  matched  by increased  service levels (which could be of little  value),
they  represent  pure  transfers  with  little efficiency effect.  Except,  that  is, if the shadow cost of public funds is  not
considered.  When  the distortionary  costs of raising  the additional  revenues are incorporated,  the  welfare impact  of
the  increased spending,  no matter  what  it finances, can be large and negative.
25over-use.
Purchaser-provider  split
The  formal separation  of purchaser  and provider  is mixed  in the  Colombian  system.  On the  one
hand,  under  the  proposed  reforms  (when  fully implemented)  the  government  will have little  direct
role in the  provision of either  health  insurance  or health  care.  The FOSYGA  acts as a clearing  house
for  taxes  paid  by individuals  and  transfers  made  to  EPSs  and  ESSs.  Apart  from  monitoring  the
quality  of the goods  (i.e., insurance  packages and  medical  services) provided,  the public  sector  does
not  actively  perform  any purchasing  role, this  function  being delegated  to consumers.
On the  other  hand,  the  degree of integration  of the delivery  of insurance  and medical  care varies
widely.  Some  purchasers  (EPSs  and  ESSs) contract  at  arm's  length  with  provider  networks  (IPSs
and  ESEs),  while others  effectively own  such networks,  along  the  lines of HMOs.  Even  if an  EPS
owns  or  has  close  contacts  with  a particular  provider  network,  it  is required  by  law to  offer  the
services of at  least  one other  IPS  to consumers.  On the face of it,  since consumers  have free choice
of EPS,  requiring  that  each  EPS  offers services  through  at  least  two IPSs  seems  redundant.  One
possible  explanation  for this regulation  is that  it aims to increase  ex post quality  competition  (among
providers),  under  the  assumption  that  it is costly  for individuals  to  changes  EPSs,  but  less  so for
them  to switch  between  IPSs  offered by any  given insurer.
4.2  Argentina" 6
Compulsory  tax-financed  health  insurance  has  been  delivered  in  Argentina  by a  plethora  of  for-
profit  and  non-profit  institutions  in conjunction  with  a predominantly  private  supply  of physician
and  hospital  services  for  many  years.  On  the  face  of it,  this  might  appear  to  be  a  model  with
high  potential,  dealing  with  insurance  market  failures  (e.g., adverse  selection)  through  compulsory
participation,  equity  concerns  through  progressive  taxation,  and  efficiency of delivery  through  the
power  of decentralized  provision  of insurance  and services.  However, a number  of factors  have meant
1
6 Much of this sub-section relies on World Bank  (1997, 1999).
26such  potential  has  not  been  realized,  and  have led to  major  reforms  of the  sector  in the  mid-  and
late-  1990s.
Descriptive  analysis
Argentina's  formal  health  insurance  system  in the late  1980s was well-developed.  All employees
were obliged to be insured  by the so-called  obra social that  covered the  sector  in which they  worked.
In essence,  the  obras  sociales were, and remain,  non-profit  insurance  companies  owned by the relevant
labor  union.  There are about  360 such  obras,  covering about  10 million individuals  and their  families.
In  addition,  each  of the  24 provinces  of the  country  operates  an  obra protincial,  covering  about  5
million  public  sector  employees  and  their  dependents.  Obras are  funded  on  the  basis  of  (non-
discretionary)  payroll  taxes.
Retired  workers and  pensioners  - about  4 million individuals  - received  health  insurance  cov-
erage  through  the  Integrated  Program  of  Medical  Care  (PAMI,  Programa  de Asistencia  Medica
Integral),  operated  by  the  National  Social  Service  Institute  for Retirees  and  Pensioners  (INSSJP,
Instituto  Nacional  de Servicios  Sociales para Jubilados  y Pensionados).  These  services were funded
by payroll  taxes  and  taxes  on pension  benefits.  The  obras and  PAMI  combined  covered  about  61
percent  of the  population.  Another  2 million  people  were  covered  by  private  for-profit,  pre-paid
insurance  plans  (pre-pagas),  and  a further  1 million  received  insurance  through  small  mutuales,  of
which  there  were  around  one thousand.  The  distribution  of coverage  across  types  of  insurance  is
shown  in Figure  4.  The  25 percent  of the  population  who lacked  formal  insurance  would  typically
seek care through  public  hospitals  operated  by provincial  and  municipal  governments.
Most  individuals  with  formal  insurance  sought  the  care  of private  sector  providers,  although
obras  provided  on average  10 percent  of services  in-house.  Some  obras in fact  contracted  out  the
insurance  function  as  well,  paying  Empresas  Administradora  de Prestaciones  (EAPs)  a capitation
payment  per  member:  the  EAPs  then  contracted  with  provider  networks  for  service provision.  Tra-
ditionally  providers  were compensated  on a fee-for-service basis,  although  diagnosis-based  payment
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Figure 4:
28Individuals  covered  by  PAMI  were  assigned  a family  doctor,  who  was  supposecd to  act  as  a
gatekeeper  and  was  an INSSJP  employee.  Other  providers  (specialists,  hospitals,  diagnositicians,
etc.)  are paid  with  a mix of capitation  payments  and  fee-for-service contracts.
Recognizing the wide  variation  in both  wages and health  risks by occupation  and hence the wide
variation  in  per  capita  contributions  across  obras, the  Administracion  Nacional  del Seguro  de  la
Salud (ANSSAL) in theory  provided  redistribution  both  from rich to poor  obras,  and from  low-risk
to high-risk  obras.  ANSSAL also provided  a regulatory  structure  within  which the  obras operated.
Outcomes
The main problems  identified  with the provision of health insurance  were consumer dissatisfaction
with  poor  quality  (i.e.,  allocative  inefficiency),  financial  instability  (deriving  from  unsustainable
production  inefficiency),  and inequity.  We address  each of these  in turn,  and  describe the associated
reforms.
Allocative  inefficiency
Discipline  on providers  comes either  from  the  demand  side  through  consumer  choice,  or  from
effective  regulation.  Under  the  old  system,  formal  sector  workers were  not  permitted  to exercise
choice  on  any  dimension.  They  could  not  choose  how  much  to  pay  for  insurance,  because  the
payroll  tax  was non-discretionary  (and  opting  out  was not  permitted),  or  from whom  to  purchase
it.  INSSJP  beneficiaries  were not  permitted  to  choose their  family  doctor.  While there  are well-
understood  limits  to the  efficacy of consumer  demand  responsiveness  in health  care  and insurance
markets,  the  abolition  thereof  is unlikely  by itself to improve  matters.
Alternatively,  the  regulatory  apparatus  of  ANSSAL and  INSSJP  was  not  sufficient  to  ensure
quality  coverage  in  the  absence  of consumer  choice.  Some  regulatory  failures  were  obvious,  for
example  the  ability  of obras to engage  in activities  not  related  to health  insurance  (like recreation
facilities).  Others  derived  from  the  political  use to  which  executive  positions  in  the  regulatory
institutions  were put  and  the scope  for corruption  that  emerged.
Financial  instability
29Financial instability derived both from the revenue and cost sides. Total wage taxes (of which
health insurance contributions constituted about 20 percent) amounting to 56 percent of the gross
wage were deemed to be excessive and an impediment to macroeconomic  performance and interna-
tional competitiveness and were reduced during the early 1990s, cutting into the health  insurance
tax base. The 1995  financial crisis and subsequent economic  slump did not help matters, to say the
least. Of course, as a policy instrument, such tax cuts should not be seen as a cause of production
inefficiency,  but they did contribute to mounting debts amongst the  obras. On the cost side, weak
management, excess staffing levels, and rising medical care costs contributed more fundamentally to
the inefficiency  of resource use.
The power of the  trade unions, as owners of the  obras, was important in this respect.  World
Bank figures show average beneficiary-staff ratios of about  130, with some obras reporting fewer
than  10 beneficiaries per employee.  Despite the  high level of unemployment, and the  associated
low shadow wage, the enormous distortionary costs associated with such labor intensive production
would appear to outweigh the  positive welfare effects through their impact on the unemployment
rate.
Weak management of the  obras  may indeed be a misrepresentation. In fact, managers exercised
significant control of resource uses and policy choices, usually in favor of the controlling union and
not necessarily in the long-term interests of the workers. Without  any incentive to  control costs
-both  because there  were no shareholders, and because the  government imposed a soft budget
constraint - otherwise productive effort was diverted to political maneuvering and rent-seeking.
Even with little  consumer-imposed discipline, one might have expected the  obras to aspire to
productive, if not allocative, efficiency. As non-profit organizations any surpluses generated would
have to be distributed  in kind (this may explain the involvement of the  obras in non-medical ac-
tivities), but  this  should not have dampened cost-consciousness  unduly.  Instead,  costs escalated
while service quality remained stagnant at best. In fact, this situation arose because, far from being
residual claimants vis-a-vis the net revenue streams generated from insurance provision, obras faced
30very soft budget  constraints  due to easy  access to  government  credit.  Since individuals  had  no pos-
sibility  of switching  obras, even in the  event  of financial  collapse,  it was difficult for the  government
to commit  to  allowing  them  to  go under.  Indeed  it was far  more  politically  palatable  (and  in the
short  run,  possibly  more  efficient)  to  extend  credits  and  permit  continuation  of coverage  with  the
existing  obra than  to  close down  an insurer  and  assume  responsibility  for coverage  of its  members.
Thus  the  lack of formal  and  credible  bankruptcy  procedures  meant  the  threat  of shut-down  was an
ineffective  incentive  mechanism.
Redistribution
About  90 percent  of payroll  tax  contributions  were retained  by the  obra in which an  individual
worker  was  enrolled  and  the  remaining  10 percent  of revenues  passed  on to  ANSSAL  for redistri-
bution.  This  redistribution  was  meant  to  be  both  from  rich to  poor  obras,  and  from  low-risk  to
high-risk  obras.  In principle,  such redistribution  would allow the  different  obras to provide  broadly
similar  levels of coverage.
However,  in  1994 per-beneficiary  own revenues  varied  from  $5 per  month  for the  poorest  obra
to  $80 per  month  for the  richest.  Only  a token  impression  could  hope  to  be  made  in  such  gap-
ing  inequality  with  the  resources  available  to  ANSSAL  from  the  payroll  tax.  In  practice,  things
were worse,  with per-beneficiary  transfers  being only slightly  negatively  correlated  with  own income
(World  Bank  (1997)),  suggesting  only a marginal,  if any, impact  on  inequality  of health  insurance
coverage  among  workers.
From  this  discussion  it can be  inferred  that  obra revenues took  the  form  of a more  or less fixed
payment  per  person  plus  a  proportion  of the  average  wage in  the  sector.  Thus  there  was some
redistribution  within  each  sector,  but  not  across  sectors.  This  can be  compared  with  the  payment
received by Colombia's  insurance  providers  - the EPSs  - whose per capita  revenue  is a fixed amount
(based  on the  UPC),  with  no proportional  component.  At the other  extreme,  Chile's  ISAPREs  (see
below)  are  funded  more  or less in proportion  to each individual's  wage, with  no fixed component.
The other  redistributive  function  of the  ANSSAL was meant  to allow obras with different  under-
31lying costs,  associated  with different  risk profiles, to provide similar  service levels.  Since membership
in  a specific  obra was mandatory,  and  obras could  not  reject  participants,  risk  profile  differentials
contributed  only to inequality,  and did  not  have any direct  efficiency impacts  associated  with  active
risk  selection  etc.
1 7 To the  extent  that  individual  risk is correlated  with  personal  income,  the  offset-
ting  risk adjustments  could thus  in principle  have been incorporated  directly  into  the income-based
redistributive  mechanism.  Instead,  transfers  were made  not  on the  basis  of ex ante  risk,  but  on the
basis  of ex post  realized  costs,  in particular  for certain  procedures  that  were  considered  high-cost
(although  some,  like prostheses,  were cheap  but  still  included).
Current  and  future  reforms
Over the long term,  insurance  reform is aimed at  attaining  universal  coverage through  competitive
provision of at  least  a minimum  level of insurance.  The existing  fragmented  structure  - consisting  of
a  public  system  for pensioners  and  retired  individuals,  a non-competitive  but  decentralized  system
of  obligatory  insurance  for  formal  sector  workers,  an  unregulated  competitive  system  for  others
able  to pay,  and  a public  hospital  system  providing  insurance  through  the  provision  of low quality
services  - is to be unified  across  consumers.  That  is, the  characteristics  of insurance  providers  and
the  environment  in  which  they  operate,  are to  be  independent  of the  identities  of the  individuals
they  cover.  This  represents  a  rational  separation  of the  organization  of  production  (determined
by internal  efficiency considerations),  and  the  allocation  of consumption  (determined  by allocative
efficiency  and  equity  concerns).  The  major  incentive  instruments  are  to  be  consumer  choice  and,
where  this  is ineffective  or imperfect,  regulation,  both  of quality  and  financial  soundness.
1 7Risk  adjusters,  even  with  mandatory  insurance  and  no choice  of insurer,  could  have  efficiency  effects  in  the  labor
market.  For  example,  consider  a  situation  in  which  individuals  are  taxed  a  fixed  amount,  and  must  obtain  coverage
from  their  employers.  High-risk  individuals  will prefer  more  insurance  and  lower  wages  to  low  risks,  and  the  two  may
sort  themselves  into  different  occupations,  especially  if cash  wages  within  an  occupation  are  inflexible.  Risk  adjusters
can  remove  the  link  between  wages  and  the  value  of  insurance,  and  allow  a more  efficient  allocation  of  labor  across
sectors.  When  individuals  pay  a fraction  of their  wage  for insurance  (and  not  a fixed  amount)  this  story  has  to  change
a bit.
32Competition  among  obras is being  introduced,  and  by mid-1999  most  people  were  aware  that
they  had a choice of insurer.  Consolidation  in the industry  is clearly required,  and has been partially
achieved through  mergers of obras.'8  Insurers are required  to offer a standard  health  benefits  package
(the  PMO  - Programa  Medico ObligatorTio). As well as representing  a minimum  level of insurance
that  may  facilitate  redistribution  in  general,  the  PMO  has  enabled  consumers  to  make  relatively
easy comparisons  between  obras.
Competition  between  obras and pre-pagas is so far limited.  Individuals  who are eligible for cover-
age by an obra are not permitted  to obtain  formal insurance  from a pre-paga.  However, some schemes
have developed  whereby  an  obra will  subcontract  with  a pre-paga, thus  allowing  an  individual  to
formally  remain  in the  obra sector  while effectively receiving insurance  from  outside.
Through  the  solidarity  fund,  obras with low incomes are assured  of a minimum  level of funding.
Of the  individual  contributions  of 8 percent  of wages, the  obra receives 90 percent.' 9 The  additional
10 percent  is used to finance  transfers  to poor  obras in order to  bring them  up to a minimum  of $40
per  family per  month.2 0 Thus  the net price paid  by individuals  is still  strongly  positively  correlated
with  their  wage,  so it is likely  that  some equilibrium  vertical  segmentation  by quality  will result.
Part  of the  reform  process  is to change  the  $40 per family  minimum  to a risk-adjusted  (by age  and
sex) per  person  amount.  This  would increase  the  redistributive  role the  solidarity  fund  (assuming
noone  got  less than  $40  under  the  new  scheme),  reduce  the  proportion  of the  wage tax  directly
retained  by the  obras, and reduce  the  potential  for vertical  segmentation  of the  market.
4.3  Brazil 2l
Health  insurance  in Brazil is something  of a mix between a nominally  comprehensive  public  system
and  a large and active private  system.  Unlike Argentina,  Chile, and Colombia  that  have tried  in var-
l5The number of registered obras fell from 360 in 1997  to 294 in 1999.
" 5For white collar workers  the retained portion is 85 percent.
20The 10 percent also funds  transfers  for high complexity  and long-term  treatments,  as well  as some  other transfers
to obras in "special"  situations.
21 Much  of this section is based on information  reported in World  Bank (1994)  and Lewis  and Medici (1998).
33ious ways to implement  (at  least  partially)  privately  provided  mandatory  insurance  coverage,  Brazil
has opted  to provide  universal  public  insurance  (financed  from general  revenues)  while encouraging
use of the  private  sector  as  an alternative.  Consumers  certainly  have the  freedom to choose  among
private  plans,  and  are able to choose whether  or not  to use the  government  system.  The  big  differ-
ence is that  when opting  out  of the public  system,  individuals  do not  take their  financing with them.
As a result  consumer  choice  provides  little  incentive  for the  public  system  to  maintain  quality.  In
reality  the  public  system  acts  as a floor,  available to  all but  used primarily  by the lower classes.
The health  sector  reforms have concentrated  on the organization  of public service delivery,  partic-
ularly  through  decentralization,  and  the  payment  of providers  by the  public  system.  Until  recently,
relatively  less attention  has  been paid  to the  demand  side,  either  with  respect  to using  demand  as
an  efficiency-enhancing  mechanism  by exposing  the public  sector  to competition,  or with  respect  to
consumer  protection  through  regulation  of private  insurance.
The  public  insurance  system
Until  1993 public  insurance  was implemented  through  INAMPS  (Instituto  Nactonal  de Assisten-
cia Medica e Premndencia Social),  the  medical  arm  of  social security.  INAMPS  originally  covered
contributors  to  social  security,  i.e.,  formal  sector  workers,  but  under  the  new constitution  of 1988
and  subsequent  legislation  coverage  was  nominally  extended  to  the  whole  population.  Having  a
universal  right  to  health  care,  as  enshrined  in  the  constitution  however,  has  not  helped  those  in
the  northern  states  who  continue  to  lack adequate  medical  care  facilities.  Public  health  insurance
expenditures  are financed through  earmarked  taxes  (e.g., a tax on the  gross income  of enterprises  -
Contribuicao  Financeira  para o Setor Social, or COFINS,  and a 0.3 percent  financial transactions  tax
- Contribuicao  Social  sobre a Movimentacao  Financeira)  and  general  tax  revenues  of the  federal,
state,  and  municipal  governments.
A comprehensive  reform  of the  health  system  (Reforma  Sanitdria)  was instigated  in the  early
1980s.  The  first  phase  of  this,  in  1984,  was  the  integrated  health  actions  (AIS)  reform,  which
shifted  some supply  to under-utilized  public  hospitals,  and  coordinated  the  functions  of INAMPS
34with  the  Ministry  of  Health.  Later,  in  1987-8,  a further  reform  (SUDS  - Sistemas  Unificados
e Descentralizados  de  Satide,  or  Unified  and  Decentralized  Health  Systems)  led to  a  transfer  of
INAMPS  staff  and  facilities  to  state  health  secretariats,  with  the  central  agency  acting  solely as  a
funding  conduit  (and  being  renamed  the  INSS  - Instituto  Nacional  de  Seguranga  Social).  This
decentralization  reform  was  partially  reversed  in the  third  phase  in  1990 under  the  SUS  reform
(Sistema  Unico de Satide  - Single Health  System),  with  INAMPS  reverting  to  a more  centralized
structure,  although  state  governments  were given authority  to write contracts  with private  providers.
In  1993 INAMPS  was  abolished  and  integrated  into  the  Ministry  of Health  under  the  umbrella  of
the  SAS,  Secretaria  de A,coes de Satide.  The  main  function  of the  SAS is to transfer  funds  to state
health  secretariats. 22
INAMPS  implemented  most  of its  insurance  coverage  through  contracting  with  private  sector
providers,  first  on a fee-for-service  basis,  but  later  using  a U.S. Medicare-type  prospective  payment
system  (PPS).  There  are currently  two  PPSs  in operation,  for  outpatient  and  inpatient  services
respectively.23 There  have been significant  problems  with data  management  under  these  schemes  -
indeed,  the  cost control  attributes  of prospective  payment  have probably  been ineffective  because  of
a lack of monitoring  and evaluation  by the  public  payer.24
The  prospective  payment  of medical  providers  and  hospitals  on the  basis of utilization  suggests
that  the  Brazilian  government  has chosen a limited  version  of contracting  out.  This  reimbursement
22Some of this transfer  is made prospectively  on a per  capita  basis for the purposes of primary  care.
231I  think the  PPS  for out-patients  is actually  a per capita  transfer from the central government  to the states,  which
is then  used to finance care.  But I'm  not sure  what  the relationship  is between usage and  payment  - i.e., if that  is
truely  prospective  or not.
24Let me explain:  if diagnoses are inelastic and verifiable, then  PPSs provide good incentives for cost containment
(although  they  may still overpay  for cheap cases, see  Chalkey and  Malcomson (1999))  However, if the  payer does
not  observe  the  validity of the  diagnsis  or subsequent  resource use,  providers  can  increase  their  revenues by over-
diagnosing.  In theory,  the  incentives for cost control  remain,  as the provider  continues  to  be the  residual  claimant,
and the  social cost  increases only  due to the  distortionary  costs of raising  the additional  revenues to  pay the  higher
charges.  However if the higher revenues can only be consumed in certain ways (e.g., through  the purchase of high-tech
equipment)  then  production  inefficiency adds to  the social cost.
35mechanism  does  not  represent  the  contracting  out  of the  management  of individuals'  health  care
needs  in any meaningful  sense,  as might  be  descriptive  of capitation  funding  mechanisms.  Nor does
it  represent  the  contracting  out  of insurance,  which  again  could  be  implemented  through  a (risk-
adjusted)  capitation  payment  to  an intermediary  that  would  provide  coverage  for the  individual  of
agreed  services with  associated  copayments,  etc.  Thus  while the  private  sector  is heavily  involved  in
the delivery  of services financed  by public  insurance,  the  incentives  of providers  to focus on outcomes
(i.e., health)  as opposed  to inputs,  are relatively  weak, with predictable  impacts  on quality  and costs.
Private  insurance
Private  insurance  covered  about  25 percent  of the  population  in the  mid-1990s.  The  expansion
in private  coverage  over the past  30 years  has been brought  about  by a number  of factors,  including
growing  incomes  (in the  1970s),  a tax  deduction  of out-of-pocket  expenditures  and  premiums,  and
the  deteriorating  quality  of the  public  system.
Private  insurance  is provided  through  four  alternative  types  of organizations.  The  largest,  and
historically  most  important,  is the  prepaid  group  practice  (PGP),  which  is similar  to the  U.S. staff
model  HMO  (i.e.,  physicians  are  salaried  employees  of  the  insurer),  and  had  (in  1991)  about  47
percent  of  the  private  insurance  market.  Medical  cooperatives  (like  IPA  - Individual  Practice
Association  - models  in the  United  States)  restrict  use to  a set  of preferred  providers  with  whom
contracts  are  written,  and  captured  28 percent  of the  market  in  1991. Large  employers  (20 percent
of the  market)  at  times  self-insure  and  offer company  health  plans,  sometimes  contracting  out  the
administrative  functions  to  financial  intermediaries.  Finally,  only a very  small  proportion  of those
covered  by private  insurance  (4 percent)  enroll  in indemnity  plans  (i.e.,  reimbursement  insurance).
Regulation  of the  private  insurance  market  was virtually  non-existent  until  1998. Indeed,  in the
early  1990s a request  by the prepaid  group  practice  trade  association  (ABRAMGE,  whose members
represent  45 percent  of the  PGP  market)  for  public  regulation  was turned  down.  Thus  exclusions
and  restrictions  are  common,  financial  soundness  unchecked,  and  fraudulent  practices  are  at  least
36perceived to  be prevalent. 25 In fact, the poor reputation of PGPs has been the  main factor  con-
tributing  to the  relative growth of medical cooperatives and company health  plans over the  past
10 years, although PGPs still capture the largest portion of the market.  Lately however, a number
of regulatory initiatives have arisen.  These include a regulatory framework created by the federal
government, and the  establishment of a Supplemental Health Department  within the  Ministry of
Health and a Supplemental Health Board (consisting  of representatives from private insurance com-
panies, government, and  consumer groups) to  improve monitoring and  control.  An independent
regulatory agency is currently being considered in conjunction with technical assistance from the
Inter-American Development Bank, to cover issues of public information, solvency,  accreditation of
plans, quality, consumer rights, and risk management.
Meeting  efficiency  and equity  objectives
It could be hoped that  Brazil's universal public insurance system complemented by an  active
private insurance option,  and its  heavy reliance on private sector provision of medical care, could
strike a balance between the efficiency  and equity concerns  outlined in the first section of this paper.
However, despite the  ambitious nature of reforms over the  past  15 to  20 years, the  system falls
short  of achieving this goal.  On the  one hand, to be meaningfully implemented, a universal base
level of public insurance must be supported by medical care services  that  are in fact available to all.
However  the  quality of and access to publicly financed services varies widely, suggesting that  the
public system is insufficient  to meet the needs of the poor. 26
The efficiency  attributes  of private delivery on the other hand have been compromised by exactly
2 5The  public  bad  nature  of  a  reputation  for  poor  performance  explains  ABRAMGE's  request  to  the  authorities  for
external  regulation.  Effective  self-regulation  would  have  required  the  establishment  of  a  reputation,  that,  given  the
behavior  of  some  PGPs,  was  costly  to  achieve.  Using  an  outsider  to  gain  credibility  would  have  been  cheaper,  but
was  not  attractive  to  the  government.
26An  alternative  interpretation  is that  the  public  system  is  too  generous  for  the  non-poor,  but  given  that  the  poor
often  pay  relatively  high  prices  to  use  the  private  system  suggests  that  any  base  level  of public  insurance  is  essentially
worthless  to  them.
37those  characteristics  of health  care and  health  insurance  that  suggest  caution  in relying  too  heavily
on  the  market  to  generate  quality  and  cost  savings.  Unregulated,  private  insurance  companies
have provided  limited  insurance  (no lifetime coverage,  excluded  conditions,  and other  limitations  on
coverage),  and  despite  avoiding  the  fee-for-service paradigm  have been unable  to  control  costs.
4.4  Chile27
Chile's  health  system  is one  of the  more  closely and  thoroughly  studied  in  Latin  America.  The
country  undertook  wide-ranging  and  innovative  reforms  of  its  health  and  social  security  systems
starting  in  the  early  1980s partly  in  response  to  failures  of the  bureaucratic  centralized  regimes
that  had  prevailed  previously.  Similar  to  the  arrangements  in  Argentina,  the  reformed  Chilean
system  of compulsory  health  insurance  couples  private  provision  of insurance  for some with  public
insurance  for others.  Funding  is primarily  through  a proportional  payroll  and pensions  tax,  although
there  is no  equivalent  of  Argentina's  redistribution  fund.28 Colombia's  reforms  have  been  more
ambitious,  implementing  more  fully a redistributive  allocation  mechanism,  while privatizing,  or  at
least  corporatizing,  insurance  provision  to  a greater  degree.  The  pattern  of insurance  coverage  by
income  and  risk  category  that  has  resulted  in Chile  has  been  criticized  by  some  commentators.
Nevertheless  this  pattern  could  be  appropriate  under  certain  assumptions  about  the  redistributive
capacity  of the  tax  and  transfer  system.
The  mix  of  public  and  private  insurance
Under  the  reformed  system,  formal  sector  workers  and  pensioners  are required  to  contribute  7
percent  of their  incomes  to  finance  health  insurance.  Each  individual  has  the  choice  to  allocate
his/her  contributions  to one of about  35 private  insurance  companies,  known  as ISAPREs,  or to the
Fundo  Nacional  de Salud,  FONASA  (National  Health  Fund).  The  designated  recipient  of the  funds
then  provides  insurance  coverage  for  the  individual  and  his/her  dependents.  Individuals  who  are
2 7This  sub-section  relies  heavily  on  Larrafiaga  (1997)  and  Bitran  (1998).
2 "There  might  be  a reinsurance  fund,  but  this  is  different.
38unemployed  or who  work  in the  informal  sector  are  automatically  covered  by the  public  insurance
system.
The  private  insurance  sector  consists  of about  35 ISAPREs,29 covered  about  31 percent  of con-
tributors  in  1995,  and  accounted  for  about  half of insured  medical  care  spending.  ISAPREs  can
offer multiple  policies,  and  are free to  charge  corresponding  premiums.  These  premiums  can  vary
on the  basis of age,  gender,  and  the number  of insured,  and  on the  quality  and extent  of insurance,
for example  as defined by the extent  of coinsurance  and copayments.30 Individuals  are permitted  to
increase  their  contributions  above  the 7 percent  of income in order to purchase  a higher cost  policy.
In  1995 there  were close to 9,000 policies offered by ISAPREs,  reflecting  a near  continuum  of vertical
differentiation  matching  the  distribution  of wages and hence contributions.
One important  characteristic  of contracts  offered by ISAPREs  is that  they  often  include  stop-loss
components,  limiting  the financial  risk of the insurer to a certain  amount  (above which the individual
receives  no  reimbursement).  This  feature  is perverse.  Normally  we think  of optimal  insurance  as
covering  catastrophic  events  nearly  in full,  but  with  demand-controlling  cost-sharing  in the  form  of
deductibles  and/or  coinsurance  at  lower levels of expenditure.  Indeed,  the  stop-loss  feature,  more
than  explicit  restrictions  on  covered  services,  limits  the  extent  of  insurance  actually  offered,  and
means  that  the  high-risk  - especially  the  elderly  - choose not  to participate.  Table  1 reports  the
shares  of each  age group  enrolled  in FONASA  and the  ISAPREs.
Of course,  those  with  low incomes also tend  to choose not  to participate  in the  ISAPRE  system
because  the  premiums  are  unaffordable,  and  because  the  public  system  provides  free insurance. 3'
Figure  5 confirms  this  pattern  of demand,  although  it has  changed  over  time.  FONASA  classifies
29In  1997 there  were  34 ISAPREs:  21 were  open  to  any purchaser,  and  13 were  closed  funds,  open  only  to employees
of  specific  firms.
3 0ISAPREs  cannot  discontinue  insurance,  and  can  impose  at  most  an  18-month  waiting  period  on  clients  for  pre-
existing  conditions.
31  In  terms  of  the  choice  between  private  and  public  insurance,  the  latter  is  free  even  for  contributors,  since  their
contributions  are  non-discretionary.  The  premiums  charged  by  private  insurers  are  higher  than  7  percent  of  income,
but  are  of  course  discretionary.
39Age group
Insurance  0-1  2-14  15-24  25-54  55-64  65+  Total
FONASA  65.8  64.7  58.3  57.0  68.3  79.9  61.8
ISAPREs  24.9  23.9  22.4  26.7  16.5  6.9  23.1
Other  9.3  11.4  19.3  16.3  15.2  13.2  15.1
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Source: Uribe et al. (1999) Table 2.1
Table 1: Chilean health insurance: Distribution of coverage by age
beneficiaries into four income groups, labelled A (the poorest) through D (the richest).  (It also has
a fifth classification, E, for non-beneficiariers, i.e., those enrolled with an ISAPRE, or not formally
registered with FONASA.) In  1994, half of FONASA's beneficiaries came from the  lowest income
group, 25 percent from the next group, and around 12-13 from each of the richer two groups C and
D. In 1996 this picture started to change, with individuals from the poorest group representing just
one-third of FONASA enrollees, while the share of group D enrollees doubled to about 25 percent.
The shares of groups B and C however did not conform with this convergent tendency. 32
In most dual public-private systems, the coverage offered by the public system is independent
of income, although in practice some correlation is to be expected if public facilities in poorer areas
are of lower quality. However, in Chile this is not the case. In fact, there is in principle a negative
correlation between income and coverage  for those choosing the public system because copayments of
between 0 and 50 percent are charged on a means-tested basis for hospital services. 33 Thus, holding
risk constant, the value of public coverage falls with income. Since the value of endogenously priced
private  insurance increases with income, the  income profile of coverage is U-shaped.  This design
32This  discussion  is incomplete  as it has not  been established  that  the income categories  represent  quartiles  (i.e.,
with  equal  numbers of individuals  across the population).
33Larranaga  (1997).  This negative correlation  may be offset by the fact that  contributors  to FONASA are eligible for
services provided  by private  physicians,  with a copayment,  whereas the  indigent  are required  to  use public providers.
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Figure  5:
induces  more  individuals  to opt  for  the  private  system,  but  reduces  the value  of coverage  for those
at  the  margin  who stay  in the  public  system.
The  resulting  pattern  of coverage  in which those  with  high risks and low incomes use the  public
system  and  others  use the  ISAPREs  has been  criticized  as fragmentary.  This  is certainly  the  case,
but  it does  implicitly  assume  that  uniform  coverage  is optimal.  While  this  is probably  true  in the
first  best  (abstracting  from differences  in risk preferences  and  demand  elasticities),  in a second  best
world  in which  the government  wishes  to redistribute  from  the rich  to the  poor  and  from low risks
to high  risks, such  a pattern  may  not  be unreasonable.
What  is perhaps  questionable  is the extent  to which higher-income  individuals  are effectively  re-
quired  to purchase  superfluous  insurance,  or at  least insurance  of low marginal  value.  A comparison
with  Colombia's  more  focused system  is useful  in this  respect.  Under  current  practice,  Colombian
users  of the  contributory  regimen  (corresponding  to Chilean  ISAPREs)  receive a more  or less stan-
41dard  insurance  package independent  of income,  implying an in-kind redistribution  from high- income
contributors  to lower-income  contributors,  which results  in two tiers  of more or  less uniform  health
insurance.  In the  ISAPRE  system  however, above the public  level of insurance  there  is a continuum
of  insurance  qualities,  increasing  with  income.  The  Colombian  arrangement  therefore  allows  for
some redistribution  within  the  group  of relatively  higher-income  individuals.  Perhaps  more  impor-
tantly,  since the  average  value  of the  implicit  voucher  used  in the  ISAPRE  system  is equal  to  the
average  contribution  across  all ISAPRE  users,  there  is limited  redistribution  (through  the  health
system  at  least)  between  groups  in Chile.  In  contrast,  because  the  cost  of the  standard  insurance
package  under  the  Colombian  contributory  regimen  need not  (in fact,  does  not)  equal  the  average
contribution  by users,  there  is scope for  further  inter-group  redistribution.3 4
A  final characteristic  of insurance  contracts  generated  under  the  ISAPRE  system  is that,  since
they  are tied  closely  to wages, quality  tends  to  follow the  life cycle pattern  of wages, which  may  be
somewhat  different  from the  time profile of an  individual's  demand  for insurance.  Thus it is not just
the case that  some individuals  with  high lifetime earnings  will be induced  to purchase  more insurance
over their  life spans  than  they  would  desire,  but  that  the  pattern  of coverage  may  not  match  their
pattern  of needs.  Even  if  capital  markets  work  well,  this  problem  will  persist,  unless  insurance
companies  can  write  long-term  contracts  in which high contributions  at  ages of high  earnings  but
relatively  low risk  are made  in exchange  for lower contributions  later  in life when earnings  are lower
and  risks higher.
3 4 0f  course,  to  make  definitive  statements  about  the  extent  of  redistribution  between  groups  we need  to  know  the
full  structure  not  only  of  taxes,  but  other  government  expenditures.  Focus  on the  earmarked  taxes  and  the  provision  of
insurance  is useful  for predicting  the  effects  on  distribution  of  marginal  parameter  changes.  For  example,  an  increase
in  the  payroll  tax  rate  in  Colombia  would  increase  the  resources  available  for  both  the  low  quality  and  high  quality
insurance  packages.  Doing  the  same  in  Chile  would  necessarily  increase  the  quality  of  the  high  quality  packages,  with
probably  little  effect  on  that  of the  publicly  provided  services.  Oin the  other  hand,  Bitran  (1998)  has  found  that  within
the  FONASA-financed  public  insurance,  the  incidence  of  net  benefits  is  reasonably  progressive,  suggesting  a degree
of  within-group  redistribution  through  the  public  system.
42The  organization  of  publicly  provided  health  care
About  70 percent  of Chile's  population  is covered by the public  insurance  system,  which financed
care  delivered  through  mainly  public  hospitals  and  a mix  of public  and  private  ambulatory  care.
Medical  services  financed  through  the  public  budget  are  funded  primarily  from  FONASA  and  the
general  budget  (for  the  indigent),  with  additional  resources  deriving  from  copayments  by public
patients,  payments  from  ISAPREs  that  used  public  facilities,  and  other  sources.  FONASA  acts
primarily  as  a decentralized  financing  agency,  collecting  contributions  and  distributing  funds  to
providers  through  a network  of 26 Health  Services.  Following a contraction  in public  health  spending
in the  1980s (reflecting  in part,  but  not  fully, the growth  of ISAPREs  during  that  period),  real public
health  expenditures  more  than  doubled  between  1990 and  1996 (Larraniaga  (1997)).  Despite  this
increase,  the perceived quality  and adequacy  of public  services remained  stagnant,  leading to a recent
debate  about  reform  of the  internal  organization  of the  public  system.  Some  have  argued  in favor
of moving  towards  internal  markets  (see section  2) and  introducing  competitive  pressures  into the
delivery  system,  while  others  - particularly  some labor  unions  and parts  of the  medical  profession
- have resisted  what  they  see as a move towards  privatization.
Although  a decentralized  organizational  infrastructure  exists,  in the  form  of the  26 Health  Ser-
vices,  central  bureaucratic  control  of  some  crucial  decisions  remains  in  the  hands  of the  central
authorities,  including  the  Ministry  of Finance.  In  particular,  labor  inputs  and  compensation  are
dictated  from  the  center  and  funded  directly  from  the  budget.  Some  central  control  of manpower
allocation  is likely to  be  necessary  in the  health  system,  especially  one in which  providers  are  not
necessarily  profit  maximizers  and in which service provision  has a redistributive  role.  However, allo-
cations  made  centrally  tend  to be unresponsive  to  changing cost  structures  and  needs,  and  provide
little  incentive  for innovation.
One part  of the  financial  apparatus  that  does provide  incentives  for cost-consciousness  is the  use
of a prospective  payment  system  for financing  the  use of drugs  and  material  supplies.35 As is well
35This  is referred  to as the PAD. Less common services are funded  on a reimbursement  basis from a global budget
43known, prospective payment gives good incentives  for cost control, although as discussed in section
2 it may induce undesirable actions by providers on other margins, the most common identified issue
being quality. However, even in the absence of quality concerns, the cost containment incentives are
only operative if providers can exercise choice  over input use. When the major component of costs -
labor - is not under the control of the hospital, the impact of incentives for cost control is reduced
significantly. Indeed, it could lead to a bias in favor of admitting  patients with conditions whose
treatment  is relatively labor intensive, since the shadow cost of labor to the hospital is effectively
zero, at least in the short to medium run. 36
As well as increasing the effectiveness  of incentives for cost control by allowing providers (hospi-
tals) to become residual claimants, a movement towards full prospective payment (that  would fund
wages as well as other inputs) could also generate a degree of competition similar to that  envisioned
in the  quasi-market  reforms of, for example, the  United Kingdom.  Whether  this  competition  is
socially beneficial depends, as usual, on the responsiveness  of consumer demand to quality, both as
determined by geographical constraints  and limitations on information.  When it is not,  which is
especially likely the case in poor and/or rural areas, direct monitoring and regulation of quality are
necessary.
5  Concluding  comments
Despite the  well-known failures of insurance and  health  care markets associated with  imperfect
information, the primary motivation for large-scale  public intervention in the sector has been equity.
Most often this derives implicitly from a concern for good-specific  equity, but it can also be justified
under  a mechanism  known  as  PPP.  When  the  global  budget  constraint  binds,  such  services  must  be  rationed  in  some
fashion.
3 "More  specifically,  it  could  lead  to  a  bias  in  favor  of  conditions  for  which  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between
labor  and  non-labor  inputs  is high,  in  which  case  the  return  to  a  switch  towards  a  more  labor  intensive  production
process  is  relatively  high.
44as  part  of  a  more  general  second-best  redistributive  mechanism.  Within  the  context  of  public
intervention  in the  pursuit  of equity  goals,  it is reasonable  to assert  that  the  reforms  of the  last  two
decades  have sought  not  so much  to  improve  the  efficiency of private  markets,  but  to improve  the
efficiency of public  provision,  either  through  direct  use,  or  mimicking,  of such  markets.  This  has
sometimes  been achieved  by altering  the  focus and  function  of pre-existing  institutions  - e.g., the
obras sociales in Argentina,  or by encouraging  the growth  of new institutions,  such  as the  ISAPREs
in Chile.
Coupled  with  the  reforms of the  ways insurance  and  care are organized  and  delivered,  countries
have  attempted  to  various  degrees  to  extend  formal  coverage  to  previously  marginalized  groups,
and  to  finance  this  extension  fairly.  Colombia  can  be  seen  as  instituting  an  implicit  two-tiered
voucher  scheme  financed  through  a proportional  wage tax.  Chile's  system  has  a similar  financing
mechanism,  but the distribution  of benefits  is less progressive,  so that  the net effect is in principle  less
redistributive.  Argentina's  remodeled  obras system  is something  of a half-way  house:  the  financing
base  is similar,  but  the  distribution  of benefits  in terms  of the  quality  of insurance  increases  with
income,  but  there  is  some implicit  redistribution  from  richer  to poorer  obras.  On the  face  of it,
Brazil's  health  insurance  system  serves  less  of  a redistributive  function  that  those  of the  other
countries,  to the extent  that  there is no earmarked  tax dedicated  to financing  health  insurance.  This
however highlights  the  limitations  of examining  the  health  sector  independently  of the  general  tax
and  transfer  system.  The  taxes  paid  by higher-income  individuals  in Brazil  are not  reduced  when
they  opt  for private  insurance:  the  real  question  is then  how redistributive  is the  general  tax  base,
an  issue I have not  addressed  in this  paper.
Finally,  let me briefly mention  the  issue of non-insurable  or systemic  risks.  In health,  such  risks
are  usually  associated  with  disease  epidemics  and/or  natural  disasters.  However,  recognizing  the
links  between  economic opportunities  and health  status,  it becomes  apparent  that  adverse  economic
impacts  deriving  from  macroeconomic  fluctuations  may  have important  effects on health  needs  and
the  performance  of health  insurance  institutions.  An important  parameter  in an  analysis  of these
45links  would  be  the  rate  at  which health  status  declines  in the face of negative  income/consumption
shocks,  and the extent  to which otherwise  temporary  macroeconomic  shocks translate  into permanent
decreases  in welfare for sub-populations.  The ability  of a health  system  to respond  quickly to income-
induced  health  shocks  could  be an  important  factor  in reducing  the  effects of hysteresis  on poverty.
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